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A British party leader will become the next Prime Minister. 
Since 1945, every British Prime Minister has been simulta-
neously the leader of his or her party. Political parties there-
fore influence who becomes Prime Minister when they 
select their leaders.
Since 1963, both the Conservative and the Labour party 
have had formal leadership selection systems, with their 
Members of Parliament (MPs) voting in the leadership con-
tests. Stark (1996) concludes that a party selects the candi-
date who best fits its strategic goals, and that in most 
leadership contests, the party selects the candidate who is 
most likely to deliver electoral victory. Accordingly, MPs 
face strong incentives to identify and to vote for the candi-
date who will lead the party to electoral success because their 
current job and a possible career in government depend on it. 
MPs have unique advantages in identifying this candidate 
because candidates are MPs as well, and MPs experience the 
qualities of each other in their parliamentary work like 
nobody else does. Comparing the results of party leadership 
elections between the two major parties should predict, 
therefore, which of their leaders becomes Prime Minister.
The present research uses party leadership elections as a 
form of “citizen forecasting” (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, 
1989) to predict the General Election. The model compares 
the performance of party leaders in their leadership elections, 
and predicts the one with the better performance to become 
Prime Minister. I term this process “the Party Leadership 
Model”. When data are sufficiently available to make a fore-
cast, the Party Leadership Model correctly picks the next 
Prime Minister in all past elections, except in 1970 and 1992. 
Relying only on party leadership contests allows the model 
to make a forecast 4 years in advance on average. Because 
David Cameron won his leadership contest by a larger mar-
gin among MPs (16.7 per cent) than Ed Miliband did in his 
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(−6.8 per cent), the Party Leadership Model predicts 
Cameron to win the Prime Ministership again in 2015. 
Because the data cover only 10 elections, this research uses 
Bayesian methods to predict which party leader will become 
Prime Minister. Results from the estimation process put the 
probability of a Cameron re-election at 75 per cent.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section describes 
the strategic goals of parties when selecting a leader, high-
lighting that the goal of electoral victory has played a central 
role in British party leadership elections. The paper then 
argues that MPs are both motivated to vote for the leadership 
candidate who is most likely to deliver electoral victory, and 
able to identify this candidate. Accordingly, the paper claims 
that the relative performance among MPs in party leadership 
contests should predict which party leader becomes Prime 
Minister. After describing the data and the Bayesian approach 
to analysing them, the paper reviews the forecasting accuracy 
of the Party Leadership Model in past elections. This review 
is followed by an application of the model to forecast the 
2015 General Election. A final section concludes the paper.
The Party Leadership Model
Strategic goals of parties
Sjöblom (1968) claims that major parties in parliamentary 
systems follow three strategic goals. In the words of Stark 
(1996, 125), these three goals are to “retain internal party 
solidarity as a cohesive organisation” (unity), to “win elec-
tions and form a government” (victory) and to “implement 
programmes” (policy). Sjöblom (1968) ranks these goals by 
order of importance, highlighting that a higher-order goal is 
necessary, though insufficient, for achieving a lower-order 
goal. Internal unity is the first-order goal because voters dis-
like divided parties and therefore a divided party would stay 
or end up in opposition. Electoral victory is the second-order 
goal, because without winning the election and forming the 
government, the party cannot implement its policy pro-
gramme, which is its third-order goal.
When a party selects a leader, it needs to consider these 
strategic goals. The party needs to select the leader who 
helps to achieve the lowest-ordered goal, as this implies 
achievement of the higher-ordered goals as well. Accordingly, 
each selector in the leadership election identifies which can-
didate he thinks will deliver the lowest-ordered goal and then 
votes for her. In his analysis of leadership contests between 
1963 and 1995, Stark (1996, 126) demonstrates that most of 
the leadership contests focused on achieving electoral vic-
tory. Similarly, in updating Stark’s work to include the lead-
ership elections until 2010, Quinn (2012, 13) finds that recent 
party leaders were primarily chosen by their electoral appeal.
MPs’ incentives and abilities
Quinn (2012, 16f) argues that the electoral success of the 
party determines whether and to what extent MPs receive 
office and policy benefits. If the party performs well in 
the General Election, an MP in a marginal seat increases 
his chance of keeping the seat. If the party wins the elec-
tion and forms the government, it can implement its poli-
cies, and most MPs prefer their party’s policies to those 
of the other party. Moreover, frontbenchers would get 
promoted from an unpaid shadow cabinet position with 
little influence to a paid government job with considera-
ble power. MPs have a strong incentive, therefore, to 
identify and vote for the candidate in the party leadership 
election who is most likely to lead the party to electoral 
victory.
In addition to this strong incentive, MPs also have better 
and more information about the leadership candidates than 
anybody else. As Stark (1996) and Quinn (2012) empha-
sise, instead of all party members, parties allow only MPs 
to stand in leadership elections. Because MPs observe each 
other in the day-to-day business of their parliamentary 
work, MPs gain frequent and first-hand information of the 
candidates. The amount and quality of information that 
MPs receive about a candidate makes them, therefore, the 
best judges of her qualities.
Links to citizen forecasting
Based on the incentives and abilities of MPs, the present 
research uses internal party leadership elections as a form 
of citizen forecasting to predict the General Election. The 
“citizen forecasting” approach was pioneered by Lewis-
Beck and Skalaban (1989). Several researchers have dem-
onstrated that citizen forecasts accurately predict election 
outcomes in both US presidential elections and British 
General Elections (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, 1989; 
Lewis-Beck and Tien, 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 
2011; Murr, 2011, 2015; Graefe, 2014). All of these studies 
find that most elections are won by the party which most 
citizens said would win.
Murr (2011) explains the accuracy of citizen forecasting 
with Condorcet’s jury theorem. Condorcet (1994) mathe-
matically proved that if each individual chooses the correct 
alternative with a probability of greater than 0.5, then the 
probability that a group deciding by majority rule will 
choose the correct alternative approaches unity as group 
size increases to infinity. As Graefe (2014) and Murr (2015) 
show, the benefits of aggregation emerge even in small 
groups. For instance, if each member correctly forecasts 60 
per cent of the time, then a group with 25 members cor-
rectly forecasts 85 per cent of the time.
To sum up, party leadership elections have three key fea-
tures: first, MPs have a strong incentive to correctly fore-
cast which candidate is most likely to lead the party to 
electoral victory; second, MPs have more and better infor-
mation about the candidates’ qualities than anybody else; 
and, finally, MPs vote in large numbers in party leadership 
elections and their results are aggregated using a majority 
rule. In other words, each MP should be better than chance 
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at predicting which candidate will lead the party to elec-
toral victory, and the number of MPs is large enough to 
manifest the benefits of aggregation. Accordingly, party 
leadership elections should be a good predictor of the 
General Election. The following sections test the forecast-
ing accuracy of the Party Leadership Model and provide a 
forecast for the upcoming 2015 British General Election.
Data and method
Case selection
The data include all contested party leadership elections 
which are relevant to the General Elections between 1966 
and 2015. The data start with the 1966 General Election 
because since then both leaders of the two major parties 
are formally elected by MPs. Accordingly, the data include 
the results of 15 party leadership elections in total. Stark 
(1996) and Quinn (2012) present excellent accounts of 
how the selection systems of both parties have changed 
over time. Both authors also show that the parties’ strategic 
goals have remained stable and that the changes in selec-
tion systems did not affect which leader parties selected 
most of the time. Nevertheless, to make the cases as com-
parable as possible across time and between parties, and to 
maximise the number of included General Elections at the 
same time, the data limits itself to the election results of 
MPs.
Measurement
The Party Leadership Model compares the performance in 
party leadership elections of the Prime Minister and of the 
leader of the opposition. The measure of performance 
comes from the voting behaviour of MPs and MEPs 
(Member of the European Parliament) on their final ballot 
at the party leadership election. Performance equals the 
vote share of the elected party leader (vl) minus the vote 
share of the main contender (vc). The main contender is 
either the candidate with the next highest vote share, or the 
one with the leading vote share if the elected party leader 
did not win the ballot. Table 1, discussed in greater detail 
below, shows the vote shares of party leaders, their main 
contenders, and the resulting measure of performance for 
both major parties.
A similar measure of performance is also used as a pre-
dictor in Helmut Norpoth’s Primary Model, which covers 
25 US presidential elections (Norpoth, 2001, 2004, 2008; 
Norpoth and Bednarczuk, 2012). The Primary Model dif-
fers from the Party Leadership Model in its theoretical 
Table 1. Performance of Conservative and Labour party leaders in their party leadership election among MPs in per cent.
General election Party 
leadership 
election
Ballot Name Vote share Performance 
(vl−vc)
Elected leader Main contender Elected 
leader (vl)
Main 
contender (vc)
Conservative Party
1966–1974 1965 1 Edward Heath Reginald 
Maudling
50.3 44.6 5.7
1979–1987 1975 2 Margaret 
Thatcher
William 
Whitelaw
52.9 28.6 24.3
1992 1990 2 John Major Michael 
Heseltine
49.7 35.2 14.5
1997 1995 1 John Major John Redwood 66.3 27.1 39.2
2001 1997 3 William Hague Kenneth Clarke 56.8 43.2 13.6
2005 2003 — Michael Howard — — — —
2010–2015 2005 2 David Cameron David Davis 45.5 28.8 16.7
Labour Party
1966–1974 1963 2 Harold Wilson George Brown 58.3 41.7 16.6
1979 1976 3 James Callaghan Michael Foot 56.2 43.8 12.4
1983 1980 2 Michael Foot Denis Healey 51.9 48.1 3.8
1987 1983 1 Neil Kinnock Roy Hattersley 49.3 26.1 23.2
1992 1988 1 Neil Kinnock Tony Benn 82.8 17.2 65.6
1997–2005 1994 1 Tony Blair John Prescott 60.5 19.9 40.6
2010 2007 — Gordon Brown — — — —
2015 2010 4 Ed Miliband David Miliband 46.6 53.4 −6.8
Note: This table only includes party leadership elections that selected a party leader who stood in a General Election. Both Michael Howard (Con-
servative Party in 2003) and Gordon Brown (Labour Party in 2007) faced no contender in their party leadership elections. For them a performance 
measure is unavailable. Source: Quinn (2012) and own calculations.
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justification and empirical strategy. The Primary Model 
predicts the Democratic percentage in the major-party vote 
using a second-order autoregressive process to account for 
presidential cycles, along with the performance of the can-
didates of the incumbent party and opposition party in the 
New Hampshire primary as proxies for government 
approval. In contrast, the Party Leadership Model predicts 
which party leader will become Prime Minister using the 
performance of the party leaders in their party leadership 
election among MPs as a form of citizen forecasting. 
Because the data of the Party Leadership Model include 
only 10 past elections, it relies on Bayesian statistics to test 
for association between predictor and outcome, and to cal-
culate the certainty of the predictions.
Bayesian approach
The present research relies on the Bayesian approach to sta-
tistical inference.1 Statistical inference draws conclusions 
from observed data y about unobserved quantities, such as 
a parameter θ or a new observation y. For instance, one 
parameter of interest in the present research is the probabil-
ity that better performance of the incumbent-party leader in 
party leadership elections increases the incumbent party’s 
chances of winning the General Election again.
In Bayesian statistics, inferences about parameters or 
new observations are made in terms of probability state-
ments. These statements are conditional on the observed 
data y, and expressed as p(θ|y) or p(y | y) . To calculate this 
conditional probability, Bayesian methods use Bayes’ rule. 
The rule implies that p(θ|y) ∝ p(θ)p(y|θ), meaning that the 
posterior distribution p(θ|y) is proportional to the prior dis-
tribution p(θ) times the likelihood p(y|θ). In contrast to the 
conventional approach to statistical inference, the Bayesian 
approach requires the researcher to express the prior belief 
about the parameter in the form of a probability distribution. 
In many applications, such as the present research, so-called 
“uninformed” prior distributions are used, which give equal 
prior probability to all possible values of the parameter. The 
primary motivations for Bayesian data analysis are, in the 
words of Gelman et al. (2014, 3–4), that it “facilitates a 
common-sense interpretation of statistical conclusions” and 
that it can “[fit] models with many parameters and compli-
cated multilayered probability specifications”.
When Bayesian data analysis involves multiple param-
eters, simulations are used to summarize the posterior prob-
ability distributions when they cannot be analytically 
integrated or when it would be too cumbersome to do so. 
By performing simulations, sampling repeatedly from a 
probability distribution such as p(θ), anything can be 
learned about the parameter θ. Bayesian statistics use a spe-
cific way of sampling from the posterior distribution called 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). The key advantage 
of MCMC is that it samples θ from an approximate distri-
bution and then it improves the approximate distribution at 
each sampling iteration. As a result, MCMC will converge 
to the target distribution if it runs long enough.
Although the present research does not deal with “com-
plicated multilayered probability specifications”, it still 
uses MCMC simulations because they enable a test for 
association between two binary variables when sample size 
is small. The predictor variable indicates whether the 
incumbent-party leader performed better than the opposi-
tion-party leader in the party leadership elections. The out-
come variable indicates whether the incumbent party then 
won again in the General Election. The dataset for testing 
this association consists of 10 observations. The standard 
tool of the conventional approach to statistical inference for 
testing associations in cross-tabulations with small samples 
is Fisher’s (1935) exact test. As Altham (1969), Jackman 
(2009, 67–73 and 140–142), and Sekhon (2005) show, 
however, Fisher’s exact test is too conservative by favour-
ing the null hypothesis of no association. Instead, these and 
other authors recommend using the Bayesian analysis that 
is explained in greater detail below.
Results
The Party Leadership Model predicts who 
becomes Prime Minister
The following sections test the Party Leadership Model for 
General Elections since 1966 and present a forecast for the 
2015 General Election. These sections also show that the 
varying lead time of the Party Leadership Model has no 
effect on its forecasting accuracy, and that it predicts better 
than the polls.
Table 1 calculates how well the party leaders performed 
in party leadership elections. The Party Leadership Model 
compares their performance and predicts that the party 
leader with the better performance will become Prime 
Minister. For instance, the Conservatives elected Thatcher 
in 1975 with a winning margin of 24.3 per cent, whereas 
Labour elected Callaghan in 1976 with a winning margin of 
12.4 per cent. Accordingly, the model predicts Thatcher to 
win the 1979 General Election.
Table 2 displays for each General Election the perfor-
mance of the two party leaders in their leadership election, 
the resulting forecast, and the actual result. When the Party 
Leadership Model could make a forecast, it picked the right 
candidate in 8 out of 10 past elections. It correctly predicts, 
for instance, the victories of Thatcher in 1979 and of Blair 
in 1997. The model gets, however, two elections wrong. In 
1970, it predicts Wilson to become Prime Minister again, 
when in fact Heath was elected. In 1992, it predicts Kinnock 
to become Prime Minister, when in fact Major was elected.
In addition to correctly forecasting most elections, the 
Party Leadership Model forecasts a long time in advance. 
Table 3 shows the dates of the General Elections and the 
corresponding leadership contests. It then presents the 
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resulting lead time for each election. For instance, the 
Conservatives elected Thatcher on 11 February 1975, and 
Labour elected Callaghan on 3 April 1976. Accordingly, the 
model can make a forecast on 3 April 1976 for the General 
Election taking place on 3 May 1979. This is a forecast with 
a lead time of 1125 days. Overall, the model forecasts with 
a lead time of more than four years on average (1477 days).
The lead time of the Party Leadership Model has no effect 
on its forecasting accuracy.2 Although the model gets the 
1970 General Election wrong with a lead time of 1787 days, 
using the same party leadership election results from 1965, it 
gets the subsequent two General Elections in 1974 right with 
lead times of more than 3000 days. Similarly, the model 
incorrectly forecasts the 1992 election with a lead time of 
499 days, but it correctly forecasts the 1966 and 1997 elec-
tions with a lead time of 246 and 667 days, respectively. 
Based on this, it seems fair to conclude that the varying lead 
time has no effect on the model’s forecasting accuracy.
The Party Leadership Model predicts better 
than the polls
Some might argue that party popularity around the time of 
the leadership election may drive the outcome of both the 
Table 2. The Party Leadership Model correctly predicts 8 out of 10 past elections when data were sufficiently available to make a 
forecast.
General Election (t) Incumbent (yt) Performance of party leaders 
(vl−vc)
Prediction ( yt+1 ) Winner (yt+1)
CON LAB
1966 LAB 5.7 16.6 LAB LAB
1970 LAB 5.7 16.6 LAB CON
1974 (Feb) CON 5.7 16.6 LAB LAB
1974 (Oct) LAB 5.7 16.6 LAB LAB
1979 LAB 24.3 12.4 CON CON
1983 CON 24.3 3.8 CON CON
1987 CON 24.3 23.2 CON CON
1992 CON 14.5 65.6 LAB CON
1997 CON 39.2 40.6 LAB LAB
2001 LAB 13.6 40.6 LAB LAB
2005 LAB — 40.6 — LAB
2010 LAB 16.7 — — CON
2015 CON 16.7 −6.8 CON ?
Note: The leaders of the Conservatives and Labour faced no contender in the party leadership elections relevant for the 2005 and 2010 General 
Elections. For these two General Elections a forecast is unavailable.
Table 3. Forecasting lead of the Party Leadership Model. The lead equals the number of days between the dates of the last party 
leadership election and of the General Election.
Conservatives Labour Forecast Election Lead
28-07-1965 14-02-1963 28-07-1965 31-03-1966 246 days
28-07-1965 14-02-1963 28-07-1965 18-06-1970 1786 days
28-07-1965 14-02-1963 28-07-1965 28-02-1974 3137 days
28-07-1965 14-02-1963 28-07-1965 10-10-1974 3361 days
11-02-1975 03-04-1976 03-04-1976 03-05-1979 1125 days
11-02-1975 10-11-1980 10-11-1980 09-06-1983 941 days
11-02-1975 02-10-1983 02-10-1983 11-06-1987 1348 days
27-11-1990 02-10-1988 27-11-1990 09-04-1992 499 days
04-07-1995 21-07-1994 04-07-1995 01-05-1997 667 days
19-06-1997 21-07-1994 19-06-1997 07-06-2001 1449 days
06-11-2003 21-07-1994 — 05-05-2005 —
06-12-2005 24-06-2007 — 06-05-2010 —
06-12-2005 25-09-2010 25-09-2010 07-05-2015 1685 days
Mean = 1477 days
Note: Both Michael Howard (Conservative Party in 2003) and Gordon Brown (Labour Party in 2007) faced no contender in their party leadership 
elections. For the corresponding General Elections a forecast is unavailable. Source: Quinn (2012) and own calculations.
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party leadership election and the General Election. As a 
result, party popularity may outperform the Party 
Leadership Model in predicting the General Election.3 The 
following analysis shows, however, that this is not the case.
Party popularity is indicated by vote intention polls. 
Table 4 compares the forecasting accuracy of vote intention 
polls and of the Party Leadership Model. The vote intention 
data come from King et al. (2001) for the 1966 General 
Election, and from http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/ for the 
General Elections between 1979 and 2001. As before, Table 
4 covers only General Elections in which both party leaders 
faced a main contender in their party leadership election, 
and at least one party leader stood in a party leadership 
election since the last General Election. Otherwise vote 
intention polls from the previous General Election would 
have to predict the current one. Party popularity equals the 
average lead of a party in the month(s) before the last party 
leadership election. Party popularity was calculated for 
several “poll of polls” by extending the time window. The 
party leading the polls on average was predicted to win the 
General Election.
Table 4 shows that the Party Leadership Model forecasts 
more accurately than any “poll of polls”. The cells in Table 
4 score as 1 if the forecast was correct and as 0 otherwise. 
As shown above, the Party Leadership Model correctly 
forecasts 6 out of 7 of these General Elections. The “poll of 
polls”, by contrast, varies in forecasting accuracy. A longer 
time window increases the number of correctly forecasted 
elections. Nevertheless, the maximum number is 5 out of 7.
The Party Leadership Model achieves higher forecasting 
accuracy with less information than the “poll of polls”. 
Table 4 displays in parentheses the number of observations 
used in each model. For the “poll of polls”, the number in 
parentheses indicates the number of vote intention polls 
used to generate a forecast of a General Election. The most 
accurate “poll of polls” needed at least 4 months of polls 
before the date of the last party leadership election, mean-
ing about 24 opinion polls on average. Assuming each poll 
interviews 1,000 respondents, this results in 24,000 vote 
intentions on average considered to correctly forecast 5 out 
of 7 General Elections. The Party Leadership Model, by 
contrast, used only two party leadership elections. 
Assuming that each party has 300 MPs, this results in 600 
votes on average considered to correctly forecast 6 out of 7 
General Elections. It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that 
compared with a “poll of polls” the Party Leadership Model 
requires less data, while delivering higher forecasting 
accuracy.
Testing for association between party leadership 
elections and General Elections
This subsection reports the results of an appropriate statisti-
cal test to rule out the possibility that the Party Leadership 
Model correctly predicted most General Elections due to 
chance. In particular, it tests whether the probability of re-
electing the incumbent party (outcome) increases if its 
leader outperformed the opposition-party leader in the 
Table 4. The accuracy of predicting the winning party to be the one which leads in a “poll of polls’; conducted in the month(s) 
before the last party leadership election.
1966 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 Mean
Vote intention polls
 1 month 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.43
 (1) (3) (3) (2) (19) (6) (1) (5.0)
 2 months 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.57
 (2) (4) (8) (5) (27) (9) (17) (10.3)
 4 months 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.71
 (4) (9) (13) (8) (44) (15) (73) (23.7)
 8 months 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.71
 (8) (16) (23) (67) (74) (28) (90) (43.7)
 16 months 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.71
 (10) (34) (45) (85) (139) (61) (135) (72.7)
 32 months 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.71
 (10) (38) (106) (137) (238) (120) (203) (121.7)
 48 months 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.71
 (10) (38) (146) (183) (355) (265) (264) (180.1)
Party Leadership Model
 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.86
 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2.0)
Note: The table includes only General Elections for which both party leaders faced a contender in their party leadership election, and at least one 
the leaders stood in a party leadership election since the last General Election. A cell scores as 1 for a correct prediction and as 0 otherwise. 
Number of polls or party leadership elections in parentheses. Source: King et al. (2001) for polls relevant for the 1966 General Election and http://
ukpollingreport.co.uk/ for polls relevant for the General Elections between 1979 and 2001.
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party leadership elections (predictor). Table 5 shows a 2 × 
2 cross-tabulation of predictor (0 = incumbent-party leader 
performed worse; 1 = incumbent-party leader performed 
better) and outcome (0 = incumbent party was not re-
elected, 1 = incumbent party was re-elected). The cells of 
Table 5 report the corresponding election years.
As indicated above, this article uses a Bayesian approach 
to test for association between predictor and outcome. This 
analysis assumes that the outcomes are independent and 
binomially distributed with probabilities of re-election of θ0 
and θ1 if the predictor scores as 0 or 1, respectively. The 
present research also assumes that the prior distributions 
for θj, j = 0,1, are uniform on the interval [0, 1], meaning 
that all values between 0 and 1 are equally likely. This is 
equivalent to saying that θj ~ Beta (1, 1) for j = 0,1. The 
Beta distribution is the conjugate prior to the binomial like-
lihood, so the posterior in this case is a Beta distribution of 
the form p(θj|y) = Beta (yj + 1,nj − yj + 1), where yj are “suc-
cesses” in nj “trials” (see Gelman et al., 2014, 29–32).
Table 5 provides the data to calculate the posterior distri-
butions of θ0 and θ1. When the Prime Minister performed 
worse than the leader of the opposition in the party leader-
ship election (j = 0), the incumbent party was re-elected in 
one out of four General Elections (y0 = 1, n0 = 4); when the 
Prime Minister performed better (j = 1), by contrast, the 
incumbent party was re-elected in five out of six General 
Elections (y1 = 5, n1 = 6). The posterior distributions are, 
therefore, θ0 ~ Beta (2, 4), and θ1 ~ Beta (6, 2). The mean of 
a Beta (α, β) distribution corresponds to α∕(α + β), so the 
posterior means of θ0 and θ1 are 0.33 and 0.75, respectively. 
This implies that the re-election rate of incumbent parties 
when the Prime Minister performs better than the leader of 
the opposition in the party leadership election is 75 per 
cent. When the Prime Minister performs worse, it is 33 per 
cent.
To test for association between predictor and outcome, I 
analyse the posterior probability distribution of the quantity 
q = θ1 − θ0. This quantity represents the probability that 
performing better in party leadership elections increases the 
chances of re-election. To calculate this quantity, I per-
formed MCMC simulations with 10 chains of 1,000,000 
draws each. Inspection of graphical diagnostics as well as 
formal convergence tests show no sign of non-convergence 
(Tsai and Gill, 2012), so I conclude that the samples are 
drawn from the target distribution. Figure 1 plots the poste-
rior distributions of θ0, θ1, and θ1 − θ0. As the second row in 
Figure 1 shows, the posterior probability that θ1 − θ0 > 0 is 
0.95. In other words, better performance in leadership elec-
tions increases the incumbent party’s chance of re-election 
with 95 per cent certainty.
Predicting the 2015 British General Election
What does the Party Leadership Model predict for the 
upcoming General Election? In 2005, the Conservatives 
elected David Cameron as their party leader. In the second 
and final ballot among MPs, he received 45.5 per cent of 
the votes, whereas his main contender, David Davies, 
received 28.8 per cent. Accordingly, Cameron’s popular-
ity was 45.5 − 28.8 = 16.7 per cent. In 2010, Labour 
elected Ed Miliband as their party leader. In the fourth and 
final count among MPs and MEPs, he received 46.6 per 
cent of the votes, whereas his brother, David Miliband, 
received 53.4 per cent. Accordingly, Ed Miliband’s popu-
larity was 46.6 − 53.4 = −6.8 per cent. Because the perfor-
mance of David Cameron (16.7 per cent) was better than 
of Ed Miliband (−6.8 per cent), the Party Leadership 
Model predicts a re-election of David Cameron. To repeat 
the results from the above Bayesian analysis, the certainty 
of this forecast is 75 per cent (posterior mean of θ1). By 
using leadership contests the Party Leadership Model 
makes this forecast with data from four-and-a-half years 
before the event.
Table 5. Re-election of the incumbent party depending on 
whether its leader performed better than the leader of the main 
opposition party in the party leadership election.
Performed worse Performed better
Re-elected 1992 1966
 1974 (Oct)
 1983
 1987
 2001
Not re-elected 1974 (Feb) 1970
 1979  
 1997  
−0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
θ1
θ0
−0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
θ1 − θ0
Figure 1. Posterior distributions of the probability of re-
election conditional on better (θ1) or worse performance (θ0) 
in party leadership elections, and of the difference between the 
two (θ1 − θ0).
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Conclusion
Building on the analyses of British party leadership elections 
between 1963 and 2010 by Stark (1996) and Quinn (2012), 
the present research has argued that most of the party leader-
ship elections centre around the goal of finding the candidate 
who is most likely to bring electoral victory to the party. 
Because MPs benefit from electoral success, and because 
they can judge the qualities of a candidate like nobody else 
can, this analysis has interpreted votes in party leadership 
elections as conditional forecasts of the General Election.
The present research proposed, therefore, to use party 
leadership elections to forecast General Elections. The Party 
Leadership Model compares the performance of party lead-
ers in party leadership elections and predicts that the better 
performing party leader will become Prime Minister. A cru-
cial benefit of the Party Leadership Model is its long lead 
time, forecasting General Elections about 4 years in advance 
on average.
Despite a long lead time, the model correctly picked the 
winner in 8 out of 10 past elections when data were suffi-
ciently available to make a forecast. Compared with vote 
intention polls around the time of the leadership election, the 
Party Leadership Model predicted more accurately with less 
information. According to a Bayesian analysis, there is a 95 
per cent probability that having the larger winning margin in 
party leadership elections increases the chances of winning 
the General Election. The present research demonstrates 
thereby that even though the specifics of Norpoth’s (2001) 
Primary Model (US) and the Party Leadership Model (UK) 
differ, the general idea of using leadership contests to predict 
general elections travels across political systems. In its first 
out-of-sample prediction, the Party Leadership Model pre-
dicts David Cameron to win the Prime Ministership again in 
2015. The Bayesian calculation puts his chances of re-elec-
tion at 75 per cent.
The results of the present paper suggest that as a collec-
tive MPs are good at forecasting the chances of their party 
leader to become Prime Minister. As the relative winning 
margin among MPs in the leadership election increases, so 
does the chance of the party leader to become the next Prime 
Minister. This finding relates to the literature on citizen fore-
casting (e.g. Graefe, 2014; Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, 1989; 
Lewis-Beck and Tien, 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 
2011; Murr, 2011, 2015). This literature finds that most citi-
zens correctly forecast the winner of the election most of the 
time. Even though the Party Leadership Model measures 
forecasts indirectly through votes, the present research sug-
gests that MPs are good “citizen forecasters”. In sum, this 
article shows that the voting behaviour of MPs in party lead-
ership elections accurately predicts several years in advance 
the voting behaviour of citizens in General Elections.
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